bettenoir 
Well, frumps, there’s nothing I enjoy more than a good mystery, once in a while, and this week there’s a genuine enigma afoot that just happens to segue with one of my favorite beefs – how tax dollars are spent.
Andrew Higgins, writing for the Washington Post, broke a story last night about the strange “blizzard of bank notes,” as he put it, swirling OUT of the World’s biggest money pit – Afghanistan. Here’s some background from that article:
“KABUL — A blizzard of bank notes is flying out of Afghanistan — often in full view of customs officers at the Kabul airport — as part of a cash exodus that is confounding U.S. officials and raising concerns about the money’s origin.”
“The cash, estimated to total well over $1 billion a year, flows mostly to the Persian Gulf emirate of Dubai, where many wealthy Afghans now park their families and funds, according to U.S. and Afghan officials. So long as departing cash is declared at the airport here, its transfer is legal.”
“But at a time when the United States and its allies are spending billions of dollars to prop up the fragile government of President Hamid Karzai, the volume of the outflow has stirred concerns that funds have been diverted from aid. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, for its part, is trying to figure out whether some of the money comes from Afghanistan’s thriving opium trade. And officials in neighboring Pakistan think that at least some of the cash leaving Kabul has been smuggled overland from Pakistan.”
“’All this money magically appears from nowhere,” said a U.S. official who monitors Afghanistan’s growing role as a hub for cash transfers to Dubai, which has six flights a day to and from Kabul.”
To put this in perspective, here are a few examples of single incidents:
- A Chinese man was arrested recently at the Kabul airport carrying 800,000 undeclared euros (about $1.1 million).
- An Afghan diplomat flew into the emirate’s airport last year with more than $2 million worth of euros in undeclared cash.
- An Afghan man, en route to Dubai, was found carrying three briefcases stuffed with $3 million in U.S. currency and $2 million in Saudi Riyals. A few days later, the same man was back at the Kabul airport, en route to Dubai again, with about $5 million in U.S. and Saudi bank notes.
- According to Kirk Meyer, a top American corruption investigator in Afghanistan, one high-ranking official took $52 million to Dubai in one trip.
Spoils of War
By Western standards this scenario is outlandish, to say the least. Westerners just don’t walk around with millions in cash on their person. A few Middle Eastern cultural differences make the process (if not the amounts and origins) less extraordinary. Again, Andrew Higgins, gives a pretty clear explanation of that side of things:
“So long as departing cash is declared at the airport here, its transfer is legal.”
“Tracking Afghan exchanges has long been made difficult by the widespread use of traditional money-moving outfits, known as “hawalas,” which keep few records. The Afghan central bank, supported by U.S. Treasury advisers, is trying to get a grip on them by licensing their operations.”
Good luck with that!
“In the meantime, the money continues to flow. Cash declaration forms filed at Kabul International Airport, and reviewed by The Washington Post, show that Afghan passengers took more than $180 million to Dubai during a two-month period starting in July. If that rate held for the entire year, the amount of cash that left Afghanistan in 2009 would have far exceeded the country’s annual tax and other domestic revenue of about $875 million.”
And that’s just the declared amount.
Whither the Money?
With amounts like that blowing in the wind, you can bet that there are a lot of official and unofficial efforts to “follow the money.” Drug money is always at the top of the list because Afghanistan now produces 90% of the world’s supply of opium. In that case, though, looks can be deceiving. It’s a long, long supply chain that connects Afghan poppy farmers with Western junkies and you can be sure that the Afghan farmer selling raw poppy is way at the bottom of that chain.
For years now, the American public has been told that the Taliban was running on drug proceeds. Well, lots of thing in our world run on drug proceeds. As Global Research points out:
“. . .what distinguishes narcotics from legal commodity trade is that narcotics constitutes a major source of wealth formation not only for organized crime but also for the US intelligence apparatus, which increasingly constitutes a powerful actor in the spheres of finance and banking. This relationship has been documented by several studies including the writings of Alfred McCoy. (Drug Fallout: the CIA’s Forty Year Complicity in the Narcotics Trade. The Progressive, 1 August 1997).”
“In other words, intelligence agencies, powerful business, drug traders and organized crime are competing for the strategic control over the heroin routes. A large share of this multi-billion dollar revenues of narcotics are deposited in the Western banking system. Most of the large international banks together with their affiliates in the offshore banking havens launder large amounts of narco-dollars.”
“This trade can only prosper if the main actors involved in narcotics have “political friends in high places.” Legal and illegal undertakings are increasingly intertwined, the dividing line between “businesspeople” and criminals is blurred. In turn, the relationship among criminals, politicians and members of the intelligence establishment has tainted the structures of the state and the role of its institutions including the Military.”
In case you feel that it is an outrageous claim that US Intelligence is, and always has been, completely embroiled in global drug traffic, I refer you to this piece from the US Congressional Record entitled A Tangled Web: A History of CIA Complicity in Drug International Trafficking (Institute for Policy Studies)
It’s Classified . . .
Here’s the kind of thing that the American public is told:
“Opium is a source of literally billions of dollars to extremist and criminal groups… [C]utting down the opium supply is central to establishing a secure and stable democracy, as well as winning the global war on terrorism,” (Statement of Assistant Secretary of State Robert Charles. Congressional Hearing, 1 April 2004).”
Here’s the story that you don’t hear . . . (this is a rather large clipping but well worth reading and understanding fully and there’s lots more if you really want to dig):
“In response to the post-Taliban surge in opium production, the Bush administration has boosted its counter terrorism activities, while allocating substantial amounts of public money to the Drug Enforcement Administration’s West Asia initiative, dubbed “Operation Containment.’”
“The various reports and official statements are, of course, blended in with the usual “balanced” self critique that “the international community is not doing enough”, and that what we need is “transparency.”
“The headlines are “Drugs, warlords and insecurity overshadow Afghanistan’s path to democracy”. In chorus, the US media is accusing the defunct “hard-line Islamic regime”, without even acknowledging that the Taliban –in collaboration with the United Nations– had imposed a successful ban on poppy cultivation in 2000. Opium production declined by more than 90 per cent in 2001. In fact the surge in opium cultivation production coincided with the onslaught of the US-led military operation and the downfall of the Taliban regime. From October through December 2001, farmers started to replant poppy on an extensive basis.”
“The success of Afghanistan’s 2000 drug eradication program under the Taliban had been acknowledged at the October 2001 session of the UN General Assembly (which took place barely a few days after the beginning of the 2001 bombing raids). No other UNODC member country was able to implement a comparable program:”
“Turning first to drug control, I had expected to concentrate my remarks on the implications of the Taliban’s ban on opium poppy cultivation in areas under their control… We now have the results of our annual ground survey of poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. This year’s production [2001] is around 185 tons. This is down from the 3300 tons last year [2000], a decrease of over 94 per cent. Compared to the record harvest of 4700 tons two years ago, the decrease is well over 97 per cent.”
“Any decrease in illicit cultivation is welcomed, especially in cases like this when no displacement, locally or in other countries, took place to weaken the achievement” (Remarks on behalf of UNODC Executive Director at the UN General Assembly, Oct 2001, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/speech_2001-10-12_1.html )”
United Nations’ Coverup
In the wake of the US invasion, shift in rhetoric. UNODC is now acting as if the 2000 opium ban had never happened:
“the battle against narcotics cultivation has been fought and won in other countries and it [is] possible to do so here [in Afghanistan], with strong, democratic governance, international assistance and improved security and integrity.” ( Statement of the UNODC Representative in Afghanistan at the :February 2004 International Counter Narcotics Conference, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/afg_intl_counter_narcotics_conf_2004.pdf , p. 5).”
“In fact, both Washington and the UNODC now claim that the objective of the Taliban in 2000 was not really “drug eradication” but a devious scheme to trigger “an artificial shortfall in supply”, which would drive up World prices of heroin.”
“Ironically, this twisted logic, which now forms part of a new “UN consensus”, is refuted by a report of the UNODC office in Pakistan, which confirmed, at the time, that there was no evidence of stockpiling by the Taliban. (Deseret News, Salt Lake City, Utah. 5 October 2003)”
Washington’s Hidden Agenda: Restore the Drug Trade
“In the wake of the 2001 US bombing of Afghanistan, the British government of Tony Blair was entrusted by the G-8 Group of leading industrial nations to carry out a drug eradication program, which would, in theory, allow Afghan farmers to switch out of poppy cultivation into alternative crops. The British were working out of Kabul in close liaison with the US DEA’s “Operation Containment.’”
“The UK sponsored crop eradication program is an obvious smokescreen. Since October 2001, opium poppy cultivation has skyrocketed. The presence of occupation forces in Afghanistan did not result in the eradication of poppy cultivation. Quite the opposite.”
“The Taliban prohibition had indeed caused “the beginning of a heroin shortage in Europe by the end of 2001″, as acknowledged by the UNODC. Heroin is a multibillion dollar business supported by powerful interests, which requires a steady and secure commodity flow. One of the “hidden” objectives of the war was precisely to restore the CIA sponsored drug trade to its historical levels and exert direct control over the drug routes.”
“Immediately following the October 2001 invasion, opium markets were restored. Opium prices spiraled. By early 2002, the opium price (in dollars/kg) was almost 10 times higher than in 2000. In 2001, under the Taliban opiate production stood at 185 tons, increasing to 3400 tons in 2002 under the US sponsored puppet regime of President Hamid Karzai.”
“While highlighting Karzai’s patriotic struggle against the Taliban, the media fails to mention that Karzai collaborated with the Taliban. He had also been on the payroll of a major US oil company, UNOCAL. In fact, since the mid-1990s, Hamid Karzai had acted as a consultant and lobbyist for UNOCAL in negotiations with the Taliban. According to the Saudi newspaper Al-Watan:
“Karzai has been a Central Intelligence Agency covert operator since the 1980s. He collaborated with the CIA in funneling U.S. aid to the Taliban as of 1994 when the Americans had secretly and through the Pakistanis [specifically the ISI] supported the Taliban’s assumption of power.” (quoted in Karen Talbot, U.S. Energy Giant Unocal Appoints Interim Government in Kabul, Global Outlook, No. 1, Spring 2002. p. 70. See also BBC Monitoring Service, 15 December 2001)”
So. It’s true that there’s a lot of money involved; based on recent figures (2003), drug trafficking constitutes “the third biggest global commodity in cash terms after oil and the arms trade.” (The Independent, 29 February 2004). But the Taliban isn’t seeing much, if any, by now. Keep in mind, the Taliban wasn’t interested in having that revenue stream in 2000 when they owned it . . .
Or Maybe It’s the Land Grab
Earlier this month an NPR report suggested that there is a growing problem with illegal “land grabs” in Afghanistan in which President Karzai’s brother looms large.
Ahmed Wali Karzai
Kirk Meyer, who is the top American corruption investigator in Afghanistan, believes that “land grabs” of both public and private land account for at least some of the cash that is flooding out of Afghanistan.
Here’s some background from the NPR report:
“Government officials misuse the law to take control of public and even private land for development — and developers and corrupt officials split the profits. The land grabs started not long after Karzai came to power six years ago, according to Ahmad Nader Nadery of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission.”
“U.S. and Afghan officials say that the man at the center of the land grabs in one province is the president’s brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, who chairs the provincial council in Kandahar, in southern Afghanistan.”
“A State Department adviser in Kandahar, Todd Greentree, says that portions of land were transferred by signature to Ahmed Wali Karzai, or elements under his control. Greentree says Ahmed Wali Karzai was able to grab the lands because of his political connections. “To the extent that you want to question its legitimacy or not, he was operating as a designee of the president, as the president’s political representative to the south,” Greentree says.”
“In one case, the provincial council seized land in Kandahar belonging to the Afghan defense ministry; it was developed into a gated residential community. In another case, the provincial council took over water rights on land in Kandahar from a local tribe.”
“This matters because this is the desert,” says Greentree. “Water is the most valuable resource after land. A political mafia gets control of the water resource and knows where it’s going to distribute so they buy up and acquire all the land around it and then become fabulously wealthy and powerful as a result. … That’s the underlying story,” he says.”
US Taxpayers to the Rescue
And then, of course, we are told by “bleeding heart war-hawks” about how Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries on earth. 90% of Afghans are illiterate, women are oppressed, there are not enough schools or medical facilities; not to mention the fact that we’ve gone in there and blown up what little they did have. Hearing such a story, of course, Americans open their hearts and their treasury and dump $38 billion in foreign aid on the Afghans over the last eight years.
That, despite the fact that our economy is in a shambles and Americans are dying for lack of health care insurance. By the way, some of those same “bleeding heart war-hawks” who drummed up so much compassion for the Afghani shared, in yesterday’s Health Care Summit, that Americans should “suck it up” and quit smoking and eating so much and they wouldn’t have as many expensive health problems.
OK, so — $38 billion, that’s real money, that’s our tax dollars at work. One of the more curious things about that money is that more than half of U.S. assistance to Afghanistan —roughly 54%—has gone to security programs, mostly the training and equipping of Afghan security forces.
In June 2009, Congress approved the FY2009 supplemental appropriations (P.L. 111-32, H.R. 2346), closely following the Administration request for Afghanistan aid. The legislation provides an additional $3.6 billion in the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF).
Now, I don’t know about you but $40 billion seems like more than enough money to train and outfit a national police force for a country like Afghanistan. In addition, we’ve had eight years to make this happen so, where are we on that project?
Afghan police Class
In 2006, four years into the program, the Inspectors General of the State Department and the Department of Defense issued a joint Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness in which they found that:
“ANP’s [Afghan National Police] readiness level to carry out its internal security and conventional police responsibilities is far from adequate. The obstacles to establish a fully professional ANP are formidable. Among them are: no effective field training officer (FTO) program, illiterate recruits, a history of low pay and pervasive corruption, and an insecure environment.”
Assessment
The police training program has been well conceived and well executed. Trainees, instructors, and MoI officials are very positive about the program. The training program has made a good start in raising professional standards and competence. Processes and systems have been put in place to enhance readiness and improve how police recruits are vetted, paid, assigned, and equipped. Nevertheless, the readiness level of the ANP to meet its internal security and conventional law enforcement and community-policing mission remains low.
Americans, Germans, other coalition partners, and the Afghans themselves share this judgment. Despite great strides in delivering training, developing an effective, efficient, and self-sustaining police force will take time. Official U.S. government program planning carries through FY 2010, but everyone the assessment team spoke to in Afghanistan believes that the program’s success will require substantial international assistance to the Afghan police well beyond that date.
Personnel Numbers – Unreliable
“It is difficult to determine the exact number of police on duty. A June 2006 CSTC-A report shows an ANP strength of approximately 70,000 – substantially higher than the end strength authorized in the Tashkil. Reports on actual numbers of police, however, are unreliable. They are inflated and there is no personnel accounting system in place. Numbers of on duty police are determined by the salaries delivered to police stations according to the number of patrolmen listed on the roles.”
I have no experience of the military, however that personnel accounting system does not strike me as a sound business practice on the part of the paymasters.
A more recent assessment (November 2009) published in The Guardian (UK), on the occasion of a rogue Afghan policeman killing British troops, did not paint a rosy picture of progress made in the meantime:
“The Afghan national police has achieved a reputation for being badly trained, riddled with drug addicts and, many fear, infiltrated by secret Taliban agents. Despite the importance of the Afghan police – increasingly seen by counterinsurgency experts and desperate western politicians as vital to gradually bringing conflict in Afghanistan to a close – it is now acknowledged that the international community failed to build an effective and functioning police force. Many critics have argued that, because it was raised locally, not nationally, the loyalties of officers have often been to local leaders.”
“For a number of years, many Afghans have feared the police force as much as the Taliban, with officers supplementing their wages by extorting money at checkpoints, taking kickbacks from drug producers and even asking the victims of crime to pay before investigations are made.”
“The European Commission issued an independent report written by professional policemen who were appalled to discover that some police, particularly about 15,000 hired in the run-up to the presidential elections, received just three weeks’ training.”
“It also criticised a multibillion dollar American programme called Focused District Development (FDD) that has been promoted as a solution to the country’s police problems but gives new recruits just eight weeks of training.”
“’It is barely conceivable how eight weeks’, let alone three weeks’, training can adequately bring any form of security other than cosmetic,’ the report said.”
“Even more damning was the authors’ warning that desperate recruiters dropped their vetting standards in order to replace officers killed in dangerous southern provinces such as Helmand and Kandahar, making it easier for insurgents to infiltrate police ranks.”
“A confidential report by the European Union’s office in Kabul pointed out that large numbers of police were killed each year – perhaps as many as 10% of the entire force – because of their poor training and their use in pitched battles against the Taliban in the lawless south.”
So who is providing this (very expensive) “poor training”?
“The US has pumped billions of dollars into its FDD programme, which intensively trains police away from the country’s 364 districts. But the teaching curriculum has been criticised for focusing too much on basic survival skills rather than police responsibilities. Questions have been raised about the quality of the teachers, many of whom are privately contracted by the US company DynCorp.”
“Philip Alston, the UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial killings, warned in May last year that it risked simply creating better-trained criminals – or police who “would be able to extort more effectively”.
“A European police official said many of the DynCorp staff were “former US campus security guards” unsuited to the job.”
“Analyst Seth Jones said DynCorp represented a “mixed bag”, with knowledgeable officers balanced out by “people who don’t have a lot of experience and don’t have any understanding of the culture or history of Afghanistan.”
So, I haven’t solved the Mystery of the Afghan Cash Surge and I kind of doubt that anyone will, any time soon. Where’s that money coming from in “the poorest country in the world”? Your guess is as good as mine – but I’d be willing to bet that a bunch of it started out in the form of a check made out to the Internal Revenue Service.
